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Sección Artículos
Local Political Power and Housing Bubble in Spain
Marisol Esteban *, Amaia Altuzarra **
ABSTRACT: This paper provides empirical evidence of the role of local politi-
cians in the development of the housing bubble in Spain. It intends to determine 
empirically whether different political ideologies matter and whether municipali-
ties run by different political parties show housing bubbles of different intensity. 
We work with all municipalities over 25,000 inhabitants. We measure political 
ideology according to the political party to which the mayor of a municipality 
belongs. The housing bubble is proxied by the stock of unsold new dwellings. The 
results suggest an association between the local political ideology and existing un-
sold new dwellings. Municipalities governed by right-wing mayors have a higher 
number and share of unsold new dwellings than those governed by centre-left and 
left-wing mayors.
JEL Classification: O18; D72.
Keywords: empty dwellings; housing bubble; local power.
Política Local y Burbuja Inmobiliaria en España
RESUMEN: Este trabajo proporciona evidencia empírica sobre el papel de los 
políticos locales en el desarrollo de la burbuja inmobiliaria en España. Pretende 
estudiar, desde una perspectiva empírica, si la ideología política es relevante, de 
manera que los municipios dirigidos por diferentes partidos políticos presentan 
burbujas de distinta intensidad. En el trabajo se incluyen todos los municipios 
de más de 25.000 habitantes. La ideología política es aproximada por el partido 
político al que pertenece el alcalde de cada municipio. La burbuja inmobiliaria, 
por su parte, se aproxima por el stock de viviendas nuevas pendientes de venta. 
Los resultados sugieren que existe una asociación entre la ideología política del 
municipio y las viviendas nuevas pendientes de venta existente. Los municipios 
gobernados por alcaldes de derecha tienen un mayor volumen (y proporción) de 
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viviendas nuevas en venta que los municipios gobernados por alcaldes de izquier-
da y centro-izquierda.
Clasificación JEL: O18; D72.
Palabras clave: viviendas vacías; burbuja inmobiliaria; partidos políticos locales.
1. Introduction
The Spanish housing market has experienced a major downturn in Europe, begin-
ning in 2008 with the onset of the international financial crisis. Prior to this time, Spain 
was Europe’s largest user of capital markets to fund mortgages. Around 30% of mort-
gages made use of residential mortgage-back securities and the rest was covered by 
bonds. The crunch on international credit led to a dramatic fall in mortgage availability 
(Ball, 2010). The scale of the correction reflects the impact of one of the biggest hous-
ing market booms in Europe. House prices increased by a multiple of 2.2 tin real terms 
between 1996 and 2006 in Spain; house building rose to record heights, with an annual 
average of 600,000 new dwellings built in the period 2000-2006, reaching a peak of 
760,169 in 2006. Housing investment was 8% of GDP, while household debt reached 
125% of personal disposable income in 2007, mostly related to mortgages.
The problems of the Spanish residential market remain amongst the worst in Eu-
rope. Two issues are the major economic consequences of the bursting of the Span-
ish housing bubble 1. The first is the fall in house prices from their peak in 2008. By 
the first term of 2014, house prices had decreased 29.6% 2 and it was still uncertain 
whether the market would start to level off in 2014 in some regions, although there 
were signals that this might be the case. Clearly, there have been locational (by region 
and municipality) and dwelling-type variations around this average national figure. 
This has been due to differences in both local speeds of adjustment and the amount of 
house price change generated by changing relationships between local demand and 
supply. Spain’s diverse geography strongly highlights such differences (Altuzarra 
and Esteban, 2010; Ball, 2011; García Montalvo, 2013).
The second major economic consequence of the housing bubble burst is the sub-
stantial number of unsold properties that remain in the hands of property developers 
and mainly the banking system, which have proved difficult to dispose of. Some 
of these unsold new properties are holiday dwellings, but many are potential resi-
dences 3. For some years, when foreclosing on developers, banks had the incentive to 
1 There are other relevant impacts of the housing bubble of different nature in Spain. One is the mas-
sive amount of house building which has raised serious concerns about the environmental degradation that 
has been produced. Another important effect of the housing bubble is evictions which had a major social 
impact in Spain. However, this article will not deal with these issues.
2 Ministry of Public Works statistics (http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/
ATENCION_CIUDADANO/INFORMACION_ESTADISTICA/).
3 The Ministry of Public Works estimates that more than 500,000 dwellings remained unsold in 
2013 (http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/88A7D54A-A73E-4C1C-9956-2A0DC1D0D399/122300/
SVN_12.pdf).
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hold unsold dwellings on their books rather than discounting them heavily through 
sales, because that forced them to write the losses into their books (Ball, 2010, 
2011). This behaviour accounts for the slow decline in house prices until 2012, 
when the reform programme of the financial sector set up by the government forced 
banks to start releasing the unsold stock onto the market at significantly lower prices 
(Esteban and Altuzarra, 2014). Differences also exist among townships regarding 
the amount of unsold new properties that they have held in the housing stock since 
the bubble burst.
Research has recently started to examine the role that local governments may 
have played in the development of the housing bubble in Spain. This line of re-
search is still in its embryonic stages, especially from the empirical viewpoint, 
but it has the potential to have significant implications for the social and political 
debate on housing issues. The motivation for the study of the relationship between 
local political powers and the housing bubble follows from the observation of the 
different views that local powers have regarding land use and housing policies. 
When it comes to local elections, political parties have differed widely on the land 
use and housing measures that they propose. These differences may well explain, 
at least to some extent, the differences in the size of the housing bubbles in Spanish 
municipalities.
The aim of this paper then is to provide empirical evidence concerning the role 
of local political ideology in the development of the housing bubble in Spain. More 
precisely, it attempts to determine empirically whether different political ideologies 
matter and whether as a result municipalities run by different political parties show 
housing bubbles of different intensity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature re-
view. Section 3 looks at the role of local authorities in the housing market in Spain. 
Section 4 presents the database and the methodology used. Section 5 addresses the 
results, discussed in greater depth in Section 6. Section 7 summarizes the main con-
clusions.
2. Literature Review
The literature has discussed many factors (i.e. housing demand, real gross dispos-
able income of households, employment rate, number of households, etc.) that may 
lead to the formation of a housing bubble (Himmelberg et al., 2005; García Mon-
talvo, 2006; Esteban and Altuzarra, 2008; Fraser et al., 2008; Carballo-Cruz, 2011; 
Mayer, 2011; Glaeser et al., 2013). However, one factor which has scarcely been 
examined is the role that local political parties may play. The study of the relationship 
between local powers and a housing boom may be particularly important in countries 
such as Spain, where the financial problems faced by municipalities in carrying out 
their activities have often encouraged them to develop the housing sector as a way of 
raising financial resources, at the same time leading, in some cases, to mismanage-
ment and corruption.
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Among the small number of studies that have pointed to the role of local political 
parties in the making of the housing bubble in Spain is that of Garcia (2010), who 
states that municipalities have suffered from a shortage of financial resources and 
as a result local governments have found in urban development a way of increasing 
their resources through land management and new housing taxes. Similarly, Sabal 
(2005) argues that «many local governments own considerable tracts of land that are 
released for development only when demand pressures reach the point where they 
can be sold at high «speculative» prices, more with a view to replenishing govern-
ment coffers than for long-term planning proposes» (p. 7). Leal Maldonado (2010) 
and Fariña and Naredo (2010) go further and tend to ascribe the main political re-
sponsibility to the conservative party (Partido Popular) because it was a conservative 
government that approved the Land Use Act 4 in 1998 which eased the production of 
developable land for residential construction by municipalities and moreover, in their 
opinion, conservative local authorities tend to be closer to developers’ and builders’ 
interests.
To the best of our knowledge, even fewer studies have focused on the relationship 
between housing bubbles and the role of local powers in Spain from an empirical 
point of view. García Montalvo (2010) studies the effect of land use regulations on 
housing prices during the Spanish housing boom and concludes that land availability 
does not have any statistically significant explanatory power for the growth rate of 
prices at the municipal level. Yet this study does not deal with the effect of land avail-
ability on the intensity of housing construction in different municipalities, which ap-
pears to be an important element in explaining the formation of the housing bubble: 
it is not only the rise in prices but also the amount of new dwellings put onto the 
market that finally affects the scope of the correction needed in the market, as noted 
by Glaeser et al. (2008).
Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2013a), study the effect of parties on housing 
prices in Spain during the boom period and conclude that prices grew more in areas 
under left-wing parties. However, the study does not analyse the role played by other 
variables in these outcomes (such as demand variables) and more importantly, the 
study does not cover the period of market correction after the bursting of the bubble. 
In Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2012, 2013b), it is shown that a left-wing local 
government would allow approximately 65% less land to be developed than a right-
wing government facing a similar competitive election.
Our study is framed in the same line of research as the latter empirical studies. 
Two main issues make this study different from previous empirical research. First, 
the time period considered in this study is longer. It covers the years during which the 
housing bubble developed and the years immediately after the housing bust. Second, 
the boom-bust process is proxied taking into account the number and share of unsold 
new homes.
4 Law 6/1998 (13 April) on Land Regime and Valuation (Ley 6/1998, de 13 de abril, sobre régimen 
del suelo y valoraciones).
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3.  The Role of Local Authorities in the Housing Market 
in Spain
Spain is a federal country with a multi-level government structure (Tosics, 2010; 
González Pérez, 2007). Since the 1978 Constitution, Spain has tended to lean towards 
decentralization and the distribution of powers between regions and municipalities 5. 
At the local level, there are 8,109 municipalities. In each local authority, there is a 
municipal council composed of councillors elected from party lists by universal suf-
frage for a four-year term and a local government council which is the main executive 
body. The mayor is the head of the executive body and is appointed by and within the 
councillors and chairs the municipal council. The competences of the municipalities 
vary depending on their size.
Local authorities may affect the housing market through different kinds of inter-
vention (Iglesias Gonzalez, 2005). The most relevant one is the intervention in the 
land market primarily through urban land use planning regulations 6. Urban develop-
ment and spatial planning are within the remit of the regions and central government 
cannot legislate on them. However, generally speaking, all regional planning instru-
ments are derived from the culture of urban planning generated by the 1956 Land Use 
Act and must obviously be in compliance with the applicable central Land Use Act at 
all times. Thus, in fact, there are many common characteristics among them (Fariña 
and Naredo, 2010; González Pérez, 2007).
The urban planning process is a hierarchical one (Esteban and Altuzarra, 2014). 
At the regional level, there are Territorial Plans which cover the entire region but 
local governments have competence in urban planning (General Urban Plan, GUP) 
concerning the municipalities, always following the general guidelines of the Ter-
ritorial Plans. The GUP covers at least one municipality and its main objective is 
to provide integrated urban development throughout the municipal territory and to 
classify different zones of land use. Thus, building land has been made available 
in the Spanish planning system via a zoning process that classifies and periodically 
reclassifies land into zones of urban, developable and protected uses. In addition, 
the GUP preconfigures the uses, intensities of use, design of the communications 
systems and other structural elements. Developers have to implement infrastructure 
works themselves and it can take several years to win planning approval depending 
on the functioning of the municipality 7.
Despite variations, since the late 1990s local governments have responded gener-
ally in Spain to the land release incentives that local government finance, urban pol-
icy concerns and economic and social issues gave them. These incentives, together 
5 There are 17 Autonomous Communities and 2 Autonomous Cities in Spain.
6 Local authorities may also intervene in the production of public housing but these interventions 
have not been very relevant in the Spanish case.
7 The 2007Land Use Act has introduced important changes in these processes, but will not be dis-
cussed here.
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with favourable macroeconomic conditions, helped to boost house building to high 
levels (Ball, 2011; United Nations, 2008).
An important element in the local government decision-making process over 
residential land availability, as noted before, was the fact that real estate was a major 
source of municipal income during the boom period. The construction boom gener-
ated substantial local public income from the taxes on construction activities, prop-
erty sales and other local taxes based on property values.
Income was also substantial from sales of land appropriated during the zoning 
processes. In Spain, developers must give 5-15% of their land to the municipality to 
be used for public purposes (roads, schools, etc.) but it could also be sold on the free 
market if local governments wished. This was a powerful incentive to zone residen-
tial land for development because local governments gained revenue when they did 
so 8. Moreover, many municipalities sold land they already owned (empty or other-
wise) in good locations to developers. One might say that local authorities specu-
lated on the land market «in the public interest». This increased expending capacity 
was used in different ways by different municipalities and on many occasions led 
to significant additions to urban infrastructure facilities and local public services.
A second element that propelled the rezoning of land has to do with increasing 
the provision of social housing in the municipality. Land Use regulations specified 
that a percentage 9 of all new dwellings in a certain development area should be subsi-
dized. Thus, many local authorities actively supported new residential developments 
on the free market because this would in turn increase the stock of subsidized housing 
for lower-income inhabitants. In fact, on many occasions, land obtained through the 
planning process was also used for that purpose.
Economic and employment concerns were also behind the support of many local 
authorities for housing development activities. Construction is a labour-intensive ac-
tivity and was seen as a solution to secular unemployment problems in many regions. 
Moreover, residential construction, mainly in the second and retirement housing sec-
tor, was seen as a driver to consolidate tourism in many places, especially in many 
coastal municipalities.
Unfortunately, one cannot dismiss the role of corruption at the local level 
in Spain, where, as Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2013b) note, «powerful 
land-related interests found it very easy to bribe local politicians in exchange for 
amendments to local land-use plans» (p. 44). A report by Fundación Alternativas 
(2007) concluded that corruption in urban development is a widespread practice 
in Spain 10.
8 The new 2007 Land Use Act establishes that municipally acquired land has to be sold for subsi-
dized housing, thus diminishing income incentives for local authorities.
9 The actual figure varies from region to region.
10 Between January 1996 and November 2009, politicians in 814 municipalities were engaged in 
allegedly corrupt acts. Before 1999, this number was small but it started to rise as the housing boom 
intensified.
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Even though many factors could lead local authorities of different political 
colours to follow a similar strategy of actively supporting housing construction 
activities, there are still significant differences in their views on how land use 
and housing policies should be implemented. These differences are observed in 
the electoral programmes that political parties present for the local municipal 
elections. As Sole-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2013a) state after reviewing the 
electoral memorandum, «the main left-wing parties (PSOE and IU) in Spain are 
illustrative of the emphasis placed on restricting urban growth» (p. 44) while 
«the main right-wing party (PP) does not include any specific proposal related 
to the containment of urban growth» (p. 45). This different approach by politi-
cal parties may have had an influence on the formation of the housing bubble in 
Spain.
4. Data and Methodology
4.1. Data
The empirical study has been performed using information provided by three 
main sources of information: the Census of Population and Housing 2011, the Min-
istry of Public Works and the Ministry of Finance and Public Administration. The 
data refer mainly to different types of dwelling (main, second and empty dwellings), 
house prices and the electoral lists to which the mayors of the Spanish municipalities 
of over 25,000 inhabitants belong. The total number of municipalities of this size in 
Spain is 281. We work with this subset of municipalities due to the limitations im-
posed by the data: data on the evolution of housing prices supplied by the Ministry 
of Work are not available at a higher level of territorial disaggregation. In our study, 
Ceuta was excluded due to the lack of availability of the necessary data for the pur-
pose of this work.
4.1.1. Data on housing
The Spanish Census of Population and Housing (CPH) is undertaken every 10 
years. The CPH collects information on the characteristics of the population and 
housing for the whole of Spain and also disaggregated by autonomous region, prov-
ince and municipality. We worked with the last census held in 2011.
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of our sample. In the municipalities 
we studied, there are 29,169,632 people, 62.3% of the total population. There are 
11,317,371 main dwellings, representing 62.6% of total main dwellings. The propor-
tion of secondary dwellings in our sample is 35.8% of the total of this type of dwell-
ing. The percentage of empty dwellings contained in our sample is 52.4% of the total 
number of empty dwellings in Spain.
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Table 1. Population and Housing in Spain and in the municipalities  
of over 25,000 inhabitants
Spain
Municipalities of more  
than 25.000 inhabitants
Percentage
Population 46,815,916 29,169,632 62.3
Total dwellings 25,288,623 14,439,801 57.1
Main dwellings 18,083,692 11,317,371 62.6
Secondary dwellings 3,681,565 1,317,750 35.8
Empty dwellings 3,443,365 1,804,680 52.4
Empty dwellings-Total dwell-
ings ratio 13.6% 12.5%
Source: Census of Population and Housing 2011 and own calculations.
Regarding secondary dwellings it is worth mentioning two issues. First, approxi-
mately one third of secondary dwellings are located in municipalities with fewer than 
5,000 inhabitants. This phenomenon is not exactly the result of massive construction 
in the last decade but relates to cultural and family reasons. Less than 15% of con-
struction occurred during the gestation period of the housing bubble (see Table 2). 
Secondary dwellings located in these small municipalities are often the result of fam-
ily ties between generations that left rural areas in previous decades and those that 
remain living there, rather than a strictly economic interest arising from a favourable 
situation.
Table 2. Secondary dwellings by municipality size and age
Municipalities size  
(inhabitants)
Number  
of secondary 
dwellings
% %  
accumulated
% dwellings  
built between 
1990-2011
Less than 5,000 1,224,955 33.3  33.3 15.9
From 5,001 to 20,000 874,270 23.7  57.0 22.4
From 20,001 to 50,000 616,425 16.7  73.8 23.8
From 50,001 to 100,000 425,090 11.5  85.3 24.9
From 100,001 to 500,000 361,270  9.8  95.1 31.4
More than 500,000 179,560  4.9 100.0 32.8
Total 3,681,565 30.1
Source: Census of Population and Housing 2011 and own calculations.
The CPH-2011 registers information about the stock of empty dwellings. It is not 
possible to distinguish existing empty dwellings from unsold new dwellings, with the 
latter being more relevant to the objectives of this work. The Ministry of Economics 
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and Competitiveness provides data on the stock of unsold empty dwellings at the 
level of autonomous region and province; however, there is no disaggregated data at 
the municipal level 11. For this reason, we use the number of new dwellings as a proxy 
for the stock of unsold new dwellings.
4.1.2. Housing prices
The Ministry of Public Works provides quarterly information on the evolution of 
dwelling prices per square metre. This information is only available for municipali-
ties over 25,000 inhabitants since the first quarter of 2005.
4.1.3. Political parties
The Ministry of Finance and Public Administration provides information on the 
political party of the mayors elected in each of the Spanish municipalities from 1979 
to 2011. We have worked with electoral databases from 1995 to 2003, that is, with 
terms of office for the periods 1995-1999, 1999-2003 and 2003-2007. These periods 
correspond to those years in which the political decisions concerning land zoning/
rezoning and the licensing of construction that led to the development of the housing 
bubble were adopted.
As noted before, political parties have different views on some of the major is-
sues concerning the design and implementation of housing policies. On the basis of 
these differences, we have classified political parties to which elected mayors belong 
into four categories according to the traditional left-right political spectrum. The first 
category (left wing) includes mayors belonging to Izquierda Unida (IU) and other 
small left-wing regionalist and nationalist parties. The second category (centre-left 
wing) contains the main left-wing party in Spain (Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
—PSOE—) and other centre-left regionalist parties. The third category (centre-right 
wing) comprises centre-right nationalist and regionalist parties and most independent 
parties. Finally, the fourth category includes the main right-wing party in Spain (Par-
tido Popular —PP—).
It is worth noting that during the term of office 1995-1999, 40.6% of the mu-
nicipalities with over 25,000 inhabitants had a right-wing mayor, 16% a centre-right 
mayor, 3.8% a centre-left mayor and 36.6% a left-wing mayor. During two con-
secutive terms of office (1995-1999 and 1999-2003) these percentages were 25.3%, 
10.7%, 31.7 and 3.2%, respectively. The percentage of municipalities with right-
11 To determine whether the stock of empty dwellings is a correct proxy for the stock of unsold new 
dwellings, we calculated the correlation between these two variables in the year 2011. The correlation 
between these two variables at the level of autonomous region was 0.96 for all Spanish municipalities and 
0.94 for the municipalities in our sample. At the provincial level, these correlations were 0.76 and 0.87, 
respectively. We believe, therefore, that the variable provided by the CPH-2011 for municipalities with 
more than 25,000 inhabitants, used in this paper, is a suitable proxy.
116 Esteban, M., Altuzarra, A.
Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research, 35 (2016) – Páginas 107 a 127
wing mayors in at least two out of the three terms of office (1995-1999, 1999-2003 
and 2003-2007) was 33.4%. This figure was 12.1%, 44.8% and 4.6% for centre-right, 
centre-left and left-wing parties, respectively.
4.2. Methodology
We estimated two ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with heteroscedas-
ticity-robust standard error models, each with two dependent variables and one inde-
pendent variable. Subsequently, we ran a full model including a large set of control 
variables 12. The two OLS regressions are estimated as follows:
 log emptytHi = a0 + a1PolParties1995-1999 i + a2Xi + fi (1)
 share vacantHi = a0 + a1PolParties1995-1999 i + a2Xi + fi (2)
where logemptyHi is the log of the number of empty dwellings; shareemptyHi is the 
percentage of empty dwellings over the total housing stock in each municipality; 
PolParties 131995-1999 is a proxy for political ideology expressed by the political party 
to which mayors belong during the two consecutive terms of office 1995-1999 and 
1999-2003; Xi is a vector of control variables.
We use a robust standard error model after testing for heteroscedasticity by ap-
plying the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg heteroscedasticity test (Breusch and Pa-
gan, 1979; Cook and Weisberg, 1983). The results of this test suggest the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in our OLS regression model and consequently the use of robust 
standard errors is recommended. Multicollinearity is checked using a variance in-
flation factor (VIF). The results show that multicollinearity is not a problem in our 
estimations as the highest VIF value is considerably below the limit of 10 (Chatterjee 
and Hadi, 2012). The Ramsey test is applied to test for omitted variables. Finally, we 
12 One of the major assumptions of OLS regression is that the independent variables are not cor-
related with the error term. The problem of correlation may occur for different reasons. First, it may arise 
because of omitted variable bias, which makes it difficult for the model to represent a causal relationship 
between the explanatory variable and the dependent variable. Second, it may occur when there is reverse 
causality. To be sure that our model does not have reverse causality, we would need an explanatory vari-
able which is not related to other variables (observed or unobserved) in the model. This is the problem 
of unobserved heterogeneity. In our case, as in Sole and Villadecans (2011), «it might well be the case 
that pro-growth residents are concentrated in certain municipalities of the urban area and so tend to vote 
for right-leaning parties. It might also be the case that places affected by municipality-specific demand 
shocks during the period analyzed turn to the right in order to facilitate the development projects being 
implemented». If that is the case, the results of our estimates may contain some bias. Even though there 
are some econometric methods usually applied to deal with endogeneity (use of instrumental variables or 
regression discontinuity design), the reality is that none of them are without drawbacks. Given the data 
available, the instrumental variables approach could be the most feasible; however, there is growing con-
cerns about the validity of instrumental variable approaches (Imbens, 2009) as good instruments are hard 
to find in general terms and specifically in our case.
13 The sub-indices correspond to the first year of each term of office.
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check for misspecification errors in our models and the results show that there are no 
misspecification problems.
4.2.1. Dependent variables
The first dependent variable is the log of the number of empty dwellings in the 
year 2011 (logemptyHi). This variable is intended to be a proxy for one consequence 
of the housing bubble in each municipality. This variable, as noted before, computes 
the number of empty dwellings, which includes both existing empty dwellings and 
new unsold dwellings according to the Census of 2011. Given that this Census was 
undertaken after the development of the housing bubble, this variable approximates 
the number of empty dwellings at the peak of the housing market boom.
The second dependent variable is the share of empty dwellings in each munici-
pality (shareemptyHi). The information provided by this variable complements that 
offered by the previous variable. While the variable logemptyHi captures the charac-
teristics of municipalities in which the highest (lowest) number of empty dwellings 
is concentrated, the variable shareemptyHi captures the characteristics of municipali-
ties with the highest (lowest) percentage of empty dwellings as a percentage of their 
housing stock. Thus, we can determine whether municipalities in which more empty 
properties are concentrated (i. e. municipalities with large housing stock) are those 
with the highest percentage of empty dwellings, or whether, on the contrary, this 
nexus does not occur.
4.2.2. Independent variable
The independent variable is the political party to which the mayor of the mu-
nicipality belongs during two consecutive terms of office, i. e. 1995-1999 and 1999-
2003, when the housing bubble started and developed and when the most relevant 
decisions concerning housing issues were taken. This variable is used as a proxy for 
municipality ideology. This variable consists of five categories which have been built 
according to the classification of parties shown in Section 4.1:
—  It takes the value 1 when the political party to which the mayor belonged was 
right wing during the two terms of office. This is our reference category.
—  It takes the value 2 when the political party to which the mayor belonged was 
centre right during the two terms of office.
—  It takes the value 3 when the political party to which the mayor belonged was 
centre left during the two terms of office.
—  It takes the value 4 when the political party to which the mayor belonged was 
left wing during the two terms of office.
—  It takes the value 5 when there was alternation between political parties.
To test whether the political ideology of a municipality and the decisions taken 
in the next term of office (2003-2007) have a positive association with the conse-
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quences of the housing bubble, we have constructed a new independent variable (Pol-
Party1995-1999-2003). This variable also consists of five categories:
—  It takes the value 1 when the political party to which the mayor belonged was 
right wing during at least two terms of office. This is our reference category.
—  It takes the value 2 when the political party to which the mayor belonged was 
centre right during at least two terms of office.
—  It takes the value 3 when the political party to which the mayor belonged was 
centre left during at least two terms of office.
—  It takes the value 4 when the political party to which the mayor belonged was 
left wing during at least two terms of office.
—  It takes the value 5 when there was alternation between political parties.
4.2.3. Control variables
Our estimations contain a vector X of control variables which include:
—  16 dummies for the autonomous regions (Regionsi). These are fixed effects, 
one for each region. This variable captures in the most accurate way the 
specificities of each area, including whether municipalities are located near 
coastal areas or not.
—  The maximum house price increase during the period 2005q1-2013q1 (HP-
growthi). This variable attempts to determine whether municipalities with the 
highest house prices increases in the pre-boom period are those with the lar-
gest amount or percentage of empty dwellings, or whether, on the contrary, 
this association does not hold.
—  The log of the population in the year 2001 (logpopuli).
—  The percentage of the population with a post-compulsory education. This va-
riable is used as a proxy for the income of the municipality. It would be expec-
ted that the higher the percentage of population with post-compulsory educa-
tion, the higher the income and the lower the presence of empty dwellings.
—  We include a set of dummies to control for the specificities of municipalities. 
The first takes the value 1 if the municipality is a capital city at the provincial 
level and 0 otherwise. The second dummy takes the value 1 if the municipal-
ity is a vacation destination according to Exceltur 14 and 0 otherwise. The 
third takes the value 1 if the municipality is on the coast but is not considered 
a vacation destination and 0 otherwise.
—  The log of the extension of the municipality measured in square kilometres. 
This is used as a proxy for the availability of land in each municipality for 
building new dwellings.
Tables 3 and 4 display some descriptive statistics for the categorical and continu-
ous variables respectively.
14 EXCELTUR is a non-profit association formed by 25 of the most important companies throughout 
the tourism value chain.
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Table 3. Statistics of categorical variables
Variable Proportion Std. Err.
PolParties1995-1999
Right wing 0.2527 0.0259
Centre-right 0.1067 0.0184
Centre-left 0.3167 0.0278
Leftt wing 0.0320 0.0105
Alternancy 0.2918 0.0271
PolParties1995-1999-2003
Right wing 0.3345 0.0282
Centre-right wing 0.1209 0.0195
Centre-left wing 0.448 0.0297
Leftt wing 0.046 0.0125
Alternancy 0.0498 0.0130
Geographical location
Capital city of province 0.1814 0.0230
Vacational coast 0.0782 0.0160
Non vocational coast 0.4128 0.0294
Regions
Andalusia 0.1720 0.0226
Aragon 0.0143 0.0071
Asturias 0.0215 0.0087
Balearics 0.0323 0.0106
Canary Islands 0.0609 0.0143
Cantabria 0.0143 0.0071
Castile-Leon 0.0466 0.0126
Castile-La Mancha 0.0466 0.0126
Catalonia 0.1649 0.0223
Valencia Community 0.1434 0.0210
Extremadura 0.0215 0.0087
Galicia 0.0573 0.0139
Madrid 0.0932 0.0174
Murcia 0.0502 0.0131
Navarre 0.0072 0.0051
Basque Country 0.0502 0.0131
Rioja 0.0036 0.0036
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Table 4. Statistics of continuous variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log empty dwellings 2011 280 8.247 0.917 5.796 11.9384
Share of empty dwellings over total stock 2011 280 0.132 0.051 0.019 0.36
Maximum house price increase 280 0.394 0.168 0.049 1.2574
Log population 2001 280 10.881 0.846 9.800 14.8997
Post compulsory studies (in % over total popu-
lation) 280 38.528 9.938 19.7 68.4
Logextension 280 4.334 1.343 0.693 7.467
5. Results
We report two sets of four estimates each. The first set of estimates refers 
to the terms of office 1995-1999 and 1999-2003 (Models 1-4). The second set 
of estimates refers to the terms of office 1995-1999, 1999-2003 and 2003-2007 
(Models 5-8).
Table 5 presents the estimates when the dependent variable is the log of the num-
ber of empty dwellings in 2011 (logemptyHi) without and with controls (Models 1 
and 2 respectively) and when the dependent variable is percentage of empty dwellings 
over the total housing stock in each municipality (shareemptyHi) without and with 
controls (Models 3 and 4 respectively).
Model 1 (without controls) shows that municipalities governed by mayors be-
longing to parties other than the right-wing party have negative and statistically sig-
nificant coefficients. This means that those municipalities have a lower number of 
empty dwellings than municipalities run by right-wing mayors. When controls are 
included (Model 2), the sign of the coefficients remains negative for all the categories 
of our independent variable. Moreover, the statistical significance holds for munici-
palities governed by centre-left and left-wing mayors, meaning that those municipali-
ties present a lower number of empty dwellings than municipalities with right-wing 
mayors.
The control variable for regions (Regionsi) is statistically significant. The 
autonomous regions with the highest coefficients are Galicia (1.131), Valencia 
(1.075), Castile-Leon (0.927) and Murcia (0.911). These communities were gov-
erned by the right-wing party throughout the period considered. It should be 
noted that these regions do not correspond exactly to the most densely populated 
regions of Spain. The most populous regions were Madrid, Catalonia, Andalusia 
and Valencia.
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Table 5. Results. Terms of office 1995-1999 and 1999-2003 15
Dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
logemptyH logemptyH shareemptyH shareemptyH
Political Parties
Centre-Right –0.719 ***(0.213)
–0.166
(0.149)
–3.391 **
(1.169)
–0.708
(1.472)
Centre-Left –0.642 ***(8.141)
–0.225 ***
(0.075)
–3.134 ***
(0.697)
–1.486 **
(0.699)
Left wing –1.383 ***(0.265)
–0.664 ***
(0.141)
–6.091 ***
(1.439)
–3.921 ***
(0.995)
Alternancy –0.453 ***(0.148)
–0.082
(0.076)
–1.025
(0.811)
–0.122
(0.705)
Regions
House price increase –0.197(189)
3.783 **
(1.473)
Logpopulation 0.779 ***(0.039)
–1.173 ***
(0.311)
Post-studies –0.008 *(0.004)
–0.050
(0.035)
Capital city 0.243 ***(0.092)
1.049
(0.846)
Vacation_coast 0.375 **(0.154)
–0.609
(1.542)
Nonvacation_coast –0.041(0.099)
–1.240
(0.908)
Logextension 00.092 ***(0.026)
0.540 ***
(0.198)
Intercept 8.696 ***(0.115)
–0.856 *
(0.496)
15.008 ***
(0.510)
19.670 ***
(4.011)
R-squared 0.117 0.813 0.544
N 280 280 280 280
aic 723.406 329.158 1702.715 1540.678
bic 741.598 427.201 1720.907 1638.720
Ramsey test
 Prob > F
2.09
0.102
0.77
0.510
15 We have also estimated the three models using as independent variable the political party of the 
mayor according to the results of the 1995, 1999 and 2003 elections individually. Coefficients and statisti-
cal significance were similar. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 5. (continue)
Dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
logemptyH logemptyH shareemptyH shareemptyH
VIF test (all scores < 10)
Mean 1.36 2.69 1.36 2.69
Linktest
_hat: t (p > |t|) 1.000  (5.31)
0.935 
(0.404)
1  
(2.705)
0.888 
(0.309)
_hatsq: t (p > |t|) –8.15e-07  (0.323)
0.003 
(0.023)
–1.2e-08  
(0.105)
0.004  
(0.012)
Legend: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Heterokedaticity results for the OLS Models without robust stardard errors: 
Model 2 (6.40; prob > chi2 0.0114); Model 4 (15.59; prob > chi2 0.001). Dummies for the Autonomous Communities are 
included as controls, though results are not displayed.
The variable maximum house price increase between 2005q1-2013q1 (HP-
growthi) has a negative but not statistically significant coefficient.
The coefficient of the variable log of the population in the year 2001 (logpo-
pul2001i) is positive and statistically significant. The most densely populated munici-
palities tend to have a larger number of empty dwellings.
The coefficient for the percentage of the population with a post-compulsory edu-
cation is negative and statistically significant. This finding could be interpreted as 
indicating that in high-income municipalities housing demand was higher than in 
low-income ones. In addition, it is also likely that this demand came to a large extent 
from the wealthier population (from and outside the municipality) as these places are 
potentially more attractive.
The dummies for municipalities that are capital cities at the provincial level and 
for those that are vacation destinations exhibit positive and statistically significant 
coefficients. This result was expected as these places are usually more attractive for 
housing demand and developers and builders took advantage of the increasing de-
mand. The coefficient for municipalities located on the coast but which are not vaca-
tion destinations is not statistically significant.
The variable log of the extension of the municipality is positively associated with 
a large number of empty dwellings. The value of the coefficient is 0.093 and it is 
statistically significant. As this variable is used as a proxy for the availability of land 
to be developed for housing, this finding could be interpreted as meaning that mu-
nicipalities with more land available experienced higher housing development, which 
resulted in a larger number of empty dwellings when the bubble burst.
Model 3 presents the estimation results when the dependent variable is the per-
centage of empty dwellings over the total housing stock in each municipality (sha-
reemptyHi) without controls and shows that municipalities governed during the two 
terms of office by mayors not belonging to right-wing parties have a lower proportion 
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of empty dwellings in their housing stock than municipalities run by right-wing may-
ors. When controls are included (Model 4), the sign of the coefficients stills holds 
although statistical significance only remains, as in Model 2, for municipalities gov-
erned by left and centre-left mayors.
The variable for regions (Regionsi) is statistically significant. Again, the autono-
mous regions with the highest ratios are Murcia (9.176), Galicia (9.754) and Castile-
Leon (8.474). In general, it can be observed that regions in which the largest numbers 
of empty dwellings are concentrated in turn have the highest proportion of empty 
dwellings.
The variable maximum house price increase between 2005q1-2013q1 (HP-
growthi) has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant. This result was ex-
pected as the expectation of higher house prices causes the offer of new dwellings to 
be higher since builders and developers obtain higher financial benefits.
The coefficient of the variable log of the population in the year 2001 (logpo-
pul2001i) has a negative and statistically significant sign. This result suggests that 
the most populous municipalities are not those with the highest proportion of empty 
dwellings. The percentage of empty dwellings decreases by 1.2% when the popula-
tion of the municipality increases by 1%.
The extension of the municipality has a positive and statistically significant coef-
ficient (0.548). This finding means there is a positive association between the land 
available in the town and the percentage of empty dwellings in its housing stock.
The remaining control variables are statistically insignificant in this model.
6.  Could the Development of the Housing Bubble  
have been Prevented?
A logical question that arises in light of the previous results is whether the devel-
opment of the housing bubble could have been prevented once it started. To provide 
a better answer to this question, we have estimated Models 5-8 with the same depen-
dent variable but with an independent variable that covers a longer period of time. 
The independent variable for these new estimations is PolParties1995-1999-2003, which 
incorporates an additional term of office, i. e. 2003-2007.
The results are presented in Table 6. It can be noted that the values of the co-
efficients and their statistical significance remain quite similar to those presented 
in the previous set of estimations. This might be interpreted as follows: once the 
housing bubble started and developed during the terms of office 1995-1999 and 
1999-2003, the association between a municipality’s political ideology (measured 
by the mayor’s political party) and the consequences of the housing bubble (mea-
sured both as the log of the number of empty dwellings and as the percentage of 
empty dwellings over the total housing stock of the town) remained unchanged. 
The political ideology of the municipality did or could do little to stop the con-
124 Esteban, M., Altuzarra, A.
Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research, 35 (2016) – Páginas 107 a 127
sequences of the bubble. These results are in line with those of Solé-Ollé and 
Viladecans-Marsal (2012, 2013b), who conclude that a left-wing local govern-
ment would allow less land to be developed than a right-wing government facing 
a similar competitive election.
Table 6. Results. Terms of office 1995-1999, 1999-2003 and 2003-2007
Dependent variable
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
logemptyH logemptyH shareemptyH shareemptyH
Political Parties
Centre-Right –0.685 **(0.199) *
–0.162
(0.147)
–3.129 ***
(1.130) *
–0.462
(1.420)
Centre-Left –0.443 **(0.119) *
–0.148 **
(0.065)
–2.123 ***
(0.639)
–0.794 *
(0.615)
Left wing –0.937 **(0.285) *
–0.582 **
(0.119) *
–4.407 ***
(1.418)
–3.484 **
(0.957) *
Alternancy –0.483 *(0.274)
–0.092
(0.189)
–1.749
(2.187)
–0.049
(1.870)
House price increase –0.132(186)
4.276 **
(1.517) *
Logpopulation 0.772 **(0.039) *
–1.235 **
(0.310) *
Post-studies –0.007 *(0.004)
–0.044 *
(0.035)
Capital city 0.292 **(0.089) *
1.481 **
(0.845)
Vacation_coast 0.418 **(0.152) *
–0.294
(1.512)
Nonvacation_coast –0.0007(0.095)
–0.870 *
(0.893)
Logextension 0.099 **(0.025) *
0.615 **
(0.196) *
Intercept 8.589 **(0.099) *
–0.931 *
(0.476)
14.781 ***
(0.489)
19.160 **
(3.971) *
R-squared 0.089 0.812 0.544
N 280 280 280 280
aic 732.011 330.202 1711.721 1543.582
bic 750.203 428.244 1729.913 1641.624
Ramsey test
Prob > F
2.29
0.178
0.61
0.607
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Table 6. (continue)
Dependent variable
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
logemptyH logemptyH shareemptyH shareemptyH
VIF test (all scores <10)
Mean 1.17 2.62 1.17 2.62
Linktest
_hat: t (p > |t|) 0.999(10.781)
0.901
(0.405)
0.999 
(4.481)
0.954 
(0.313)
_hatsq: t (p > |t|) –1.17e-06 (0.654)
0.005
(0.023)
2.75e-08 
(0.170)
0.002 
(0.012)
Legend: * p < 0.5; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Heterokedaticity results for the OLS Models without stardard errors: 
Model 6 (6.99; prob > chi2 0.0082); Model 8 (1571; prob > chi2 0.0001). Dummies for the Autonomous Communities 
are included as controls, though results are not displayed.
7. Conclusions
The Spanish housing market has experienced one of the major bubbles and bursts 
in Europe. Research on housing bubbles and busts has been approached from differ-
ent perspectives using various theoretical frameworks. Most of these studies have 
addressed this issue focusing on the behaviour of the fundamentals of the housing 
market. However, very few empirical studies have focused on the relationship be-
tween the consequences of housing bubbles and the role of local political parties.
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the role of political ide-
ology in some of the consequences of the housing bubble in Spain. We approximate 
the political ideology of a municipality by the political party to which the mayor of a 
given municipality belonged. The consequences of the housing bubble in Spain has 
been characterized considering the stock of unsold dwellings measured in absolute 
value and in percentage over the total housing stock of each municipality.
We have estimated three OLS models with heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors. We use two dependent variables (the log of the number of empty dwellings 
and the percentage of empty dwellings over the total housing stock), one main inde-
pendent variable (political party of the mayor of the municipality during two terms of 
office) and a set of control variables.
The results show that there is an association between a municipality’s political 
ideology in terms of the mayor’s political party and some consequences of the hous-
ing bubble in Spain. Municipalities governed by left and centre-left mayors have a 
lower number and percentage of empty dwellings than municipalities the mayors of 
which belong to right-wing parties. However, the coefficients for municipalities with 
mayors belonging to right-wing parties and for municipalities with power alternating 
between parties are statistically insignificant.
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More research should be done in the future once the adjustment of the housing 
market has been concluded in all municipalities to gain a better understanding of the 
relationship between the variables under study.
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